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775J- C 
[Crim. No. 4791. In Bank. A1Jg. 8, 1947.] 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. FRANCIS PAUL BARNES, 
Appellant. 
(1] Witu...-:&ed.irect EuminatioD.-ln a homicide ease where 
the defense, in attempting to show that defendant's confession 
was unworthy of belief because of his mental condition, ques-
tioned a peychiatrist regarding paranoid trends. and the dis-
trict attorney, for the sole purpose of clarifying the witness' 
meaning, was allowed to ask the witness on cross-examination 
whether he found defendant sane. it was proper to sustain 
objection to question on redirect examination as to the dis-
tinction between I~al insanity and merlical in!,;llnity 
[t] Oriminal Law-lDstructioDS-ConfessioDB.-ln a homicide case 
it was not error to refuse an instruction to the effect that the 
jury should deeidt> whether deft>ndant's confession was freely 
and voluntarily made. where def41ndant stipulated that no 
"form of eoereion" was used by any officer of the police d .. 
partment on him, and thereby excused proof of the voluntari-
nesa of the eGnfession. 
[a] Id.-Appea1-Ha.rmlesa and Reversible Error-Instructions-
Oonfesaiona. - In a homicide ease, in which defendant stipu-
lated to the voluntariDesa but not the truth of his coofesaion. 
the jury should have been instructed that they were the exclu-
live judges as to whether or not the confession was true, but 
the failure to ,"ve (IIuch instruction did not prejudice defendant 
[1) See Z1 OaJ..J'II1'.108. 
[2] See 8 OaJ..J'II1'. 348. 
Melt. Dig. References: [IJ Witnesses, § 179; [2J Criminal Law, 
1816; (3] Criminal Law, 11434. [41 Homicide, 1145(2).. 
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where the psychiatrists called by him to testify were Qnani. 
mous in thl'ir conclusion that hl' fully knew thl' meaning of 
the questions asked him and thl' meaninfl: and eft'ect of the 
answertl hl' traVf!. and where many of the important elements 
~! of thl' confP.'ltliol' WeTf' p01TOoorated b~ witnesses. 
.. Homicide-Bvidence-8ulllcienq. - Thl' evidence. independ. 
_tlv of defendant's confession, sustained • verdict of ll:IIilty 
, of ~1JT(ler in thl' ftrst d8lll"88. where hf' was identifted by wit. 
..• D8SS8I as the person near the seene ofthl' crime at the time 
·01 thl' murder. where the murder weapon was traced to him. 
and where he directed the police in the recovery of decedent' • 
.. parse. 
. (automatically taken under Pen. Code, § 1239) 
a judgment of the Superior Court of Loa Angeles 
and from an order denying a new trial. Clement 
Judge. Affirmed. 
''Pr<lSeCuticm for murder. Judgment imposingdea1th pen. 
B. Neely, Public Defender. for Appellant. 
N. Howser, Attorney General, arid Frank Rich-
Deputy Attorney General, for Respondent. 
.·,l·.aaYNOB, J.-Defendant was found guilty on one count 
l,IIlLUl'ltier in the first degree, nine counts of robbery, seven 
of kidnaping for the purpose of robbery and three 
of rape. The jury's verdict that defendant was guilty 
:m'flll'dt!r in the first degree was without recommendation aR 
Defendant waived his right to a trial by jury on 
of sanity. and the trial court found him sane. This 
iR an automatic one from the judgment inlposing the 
penalty for murder in the first degree. 
PtJ[endaltlt attacks none of the verdicts of guilty for the 
charged in the amended information except that for 
.Ial'dler. It is therefore unnecessary to review in detail de-
DnclAmt;'" conduct relating to· the other crimea. 
an.ve:rendaJlt contendll that the trial court erred in ita rul • 
. regarding the testimony of certain psychiatrists. He 
contend" that the trial court erred in refusing to in. 
the jury to determine whether certain confessions of 
.~"'.da:llt were free and voluntary, and to weigh and de-
"mUle the effect and credibility of the confessioDII. 
/ 
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The crimes with which defendant was charged were com-
mitted between the months of March and August of 1946. 
During that time defendant robbed five women besides 
decedent, and raped· and robbed three others. 
Decedent was a dressmaker. 66 years of age, whose estab-
lishment was located in an office building in Los Angeles. 
Defendant confessed to a police officer that he killed decedent. 
According to this confession, defendant entered decedent's 
establishment carrying gloves in his pocket and a pistol in his 
waistband. He had' the "idea of holding someone up." De-
cedent asked him what he wanted and he replied that he 
wanted a glass of water. Decedent brought him a glass of 
water and after drinking it, he noticed another woman in the 
room. He therefore excused himself and went outside into 
the hall where he sat on the steps until he saw the other woman 
leave. Then he took out his pistol and inspected it as he re-
entered decedent's office. When decedent saw the pistol she 
became frightened and screamed; defendant, in turn, "got 
kind of jittery" and the pistol went off. He started to escape 
the way he entered, but someone shouted at him and he then 
decided to use another exit. As he retraced his steps he 
noticed decedent's purse through the open doorway. He took 
the purse and ran to his automobile and then drove to an 
empty lot and ransacked the purse, throwing it away after 
removing the money. 
The evidence shows that decedent was shot through the neck. 
She must have been shot at close range, for the entrance 
wound of the bullet was marked with powder burns. Two 
witnesses identified defendant as the man they saw near 
decedent's room shortly before and after the shot was fired. 
Photographs taken of the scene after the killing reveal an 
overturned glass of water near decedent's body. In addition 
to the bullet wound there was a gaping wound on decedent's 
scalp, a bruise over her eye, bruised knuckles on her left 
hand and still another bruise on her right leg, midway 
between the knee and ankle. 
On August 28, 1946, defendant was stopped by a motor-
cycle patrol in Los· Angeles, apparently for the violation of 
a traffic ordinance. As the officers approached defendant's 
automobile, they observed that he had opened a door and that 
some rags had fallen to the street. Defendant put the raga 
back into the automobile and began searching under the seat. 
He told the officers that he was looking for his driver's license. 
,i 
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The officers searched the automobile and found a knife buried 
in the rags. Defendant was then ordered to drive his auto-
mobile to the police station while they followed. When de-
fendant's automobile started forward, one of the officers 
noticed a pistol lying on the pavement near where defend-
ant's vehicle had stopped. He picked up the pistol and an-
other officer followed defendant, who had meanwhile speeded 
Up in an apparent attempt to elude the officers. The pur-
suing officer fired shots but defendant crashed his automo-
bile against a retaining wall and escaped. He was arrested 
Jater by the police. 
· 1. Defendant admitted to the police that he had shot decedent. 
led the police to a vacant lot where he had discarded de-
'_rfAT,t:'" purse after removing the cash therefrom. A ballistics 
identified the pistol found near defendant's automobile 
the one that had fired the bullet that killed decedent. 
'At the trial, defendant's statements to the police were 
admitted after his counsel examined two psychiatrists. The 
of these witnesses testified that defendant had a psycho-
'pathic personality and "was overwhelmed by guilty feelings 
:that he had in regard to the commission of his deeds. . . ." 
The witness stated that defendant had a tendency toward 
self-accusation and "was emotionally driven to make certain 
· .Statements regardless of the possible effect they could have." 
· 'He testified, however, that defendant knew the full mean-
"big and effect of the questions put to him and of his an-
The witness found defendant to be "absolutely sincere 
honest" but could "conceive of the possibility that he 
BOme details that are incriminatory and that are bad 
him, or stressed them in such a way that they might 
_:.:'~.'" his ease worse than it would otherwise have been. I 
I can conceive of this possibility; I can't say that that 
happened. " 
other psychiatrist also testified that defendant had a 
;MJY4!mo:pathlc personality. He found that defendant "would 
to be as truthful as he could to support his belief that 
. should be placed under arrest because he had committed 
.,., .. · ...... ll crimes for which he believed he should be punished 
'. _ • in that state of mind he was in at that time . . . he 
be in a more suggestible state of mind, he would reply 
.. "_-w.o.,, readily or accede more readily to what would be asked 
him that would tend to incriminate him!' The witness 
nfused to state that defendant would add untruths to his 
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story; in his view defendant "probably would be more sug-
gestible and be perfectly willing to make things a little worse 
than they were provided he were asked the question in the 
right way." 
[1] At this point testimony was elicited from the witness 
that led to a ruling by the trial court that defendant regards 
as erroneous. Defendant'li counsel asked the witness if de-
fendant exhibited paranoid trends. The witness replied that 
he had. Counsel then asked, "Q. A paranoia is a form of 
insanity, is it not! A. Paranoia is, yes. Q. And paranoid 
trends, is that a trend towards that state of paranoia t A. No, 
it is like, similar to but not identical with. That is, the term 
really means like, suggested it." The defense then turnded the 
witness over to the district attorney for cross-examination, and 
the district attorney asked the witness if he found defendant 
sane. The defense objected to this question but the district 
attol'Bey, upheld by the court, contended that since the defense 
had injected the subject of paranoia into the record the ques-
tion was proper. The witness answered the question, stating 
that defendant was not insane and knew the difference between 
right and wrong. He also testified that defendant had "fully 
appreciated the nature and consequences of the statements" 
he had made to the witness. 
Upon redirect examination, defense counsel asked the wit-
ness, "You distinguish the difference between what you said 
with reference to insanity to the extent that a person doesn't 
know the nature and quality of his acts from medical insanity, 
based upon medical science t" This question was objected 
to and the court sustained the objection. 
Defendant contends that since the trial judge allowed the 
district attorney to question the witness as to sanity, he should 
not have sustained the objection to the foregoing question 
asked on redirect examination. There is no error here. The 
defense was attempting to show by means of the testimony 
of psychiatrists that defendant's confession was unworthy of 
belief because of his mental condition. When the defense ques-
tioned the psychiatrist regarding paranoid trends there was 
no attempt to relate the questions to defendant's understand-
ing of the meaning and effect of his statements. The result of 
the defense's concluding questions was undoubtedly to leave 
the jury with the impression that defendant was insane or 
bordering on insanity; hence, the prosecution was justified 
in clarifying the witness's meaning. 
) 
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, Defendant's attempt, on redirect examination, to inject the 
question of the distinction between legal insanity and medical 
insanity was clearly improper. There was no need to engage 
in a general discussion of insanity. Defendant does not con-
tend that he was prevented from proving that he did not 
foll1 know the meaning and etfect of his confession. Nor 
Was there any attempt to prevent the defense from showing 
defendant's mental condition. The trial court merely put an 
end to questions that would have evoked general answers not 
, "pertinent to the specific issue then to be decided. 
'.;,'. After the psychiatrists testified. the district attorney intro-
;. 'dueed a police witness who had received the confession. This 
· witness was examined for the purpose of showing that the 
. was freely given. In the course of this examina-
however, counsel for the defense stipulated that "there 
intention or indication of intention to intimidate," and 
no "form of coercion was used by any officer of the Los 
Anlre141l8 Police Department upon this defendant." and that no 
"·)I'Omises were made to defendant. Finally, the defense counsel 
,stated: "I want to make my position very clear in that re-
'Prd." The district 'attorney accepted the stipulation in lieu 
.;of laying a foundation to show the free and voluntary na-
.'!h1re of the confession. 
, ': [I] Defendant contends that the trial court erred in re-
fusing to give an instruction requested by defendant relating 
· !to the confession. This instruction was to the e1fect that .the 
.' Jury should decide whether the confession was freely and 
'. YQluntarily made. The refused instruction further stated: 
· have the right to reconsider the question as to whether 
same was voluntary or not, and in this connection you 
the judges of the e1feet and value of evidence and the 
~ tmlMtil)lli1ty of witnesses as the same pertains to such alleged 
.·',_1~eut or confession the same as to all other evidence and 
Other witneases in this case." 
,The trial court's refusal to give the foregoing instruction, 
'well as a similar one tendered by the prosecution, was ex-
'";;'_1,, based upon defendant's stipulation. Defendant eon-
nOlil'lH'Br. that since he was shown to have a "subnormal 
B;'m.enUlL11T,y, amounting to a psychosis," he was entitled to &D 
rlnflil:rn.tdinm that the confession was not binding upon the 
'.' '1iu7 and that the determination of the voluntary character of 
t.lie statements, as well as the determination of the weight and 
· 8iedibUity to which they were entitled, were for the jury to 
-) 
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decide. Defendant maintains that the jury was entitled to 
infer "mental coercion." 
Under proper instructions, the jury is ordinarily permitted 
to come to an independent conclusion as to the voluntary 
nature of a confession. (People v. Gonzales, 24 Cal.2d 870, 
877 [151 P.2d 251].) In the present ease, however, defend-
ant's stipulation that there was no "form of coercion" ex-
cused the district attorney from proving the voluntariness 
of the confession. Such a stipulation. in the absence of ex-
traordinary circumstances, removes from controversy the 
question of coercion. State v. Harz, 78 Conn. 18 [60 A. 690]; 
Commcmwealth v. Desmo",d, 5 Gray (71 Mass.) 80; see 9 Wig-
more on Evidence, 3d ed., §§ 2588-2590.} 
[3] The defendant's stipulation that the confession was 
voluntary was not, however, a stipulation as to the truth of 
the confession. The voluntariness of a confession is one thing; 
the weight to be given that confession in the light of defend-
ant's mental state is another. Experience has demonstrated 
that a confession may be entirely voluntary and yet. not be 
entitled to much credence. (People v. Lehew, 209 Cal. 336, 
342 [87 P. 337]; People v. Elder, 55 Cal.App. 644, 648 [204 
P. 29]; People v. Joyce, 233 N.Y. 61, 68 [134 N.E. 836].) 
Juries are therefore usualy instructed not only to make an 
independent judgment as to the voluntariness of a confe.<;'''lion, 
but to decide whether or not the confession was true and mnde 
with the full knowledge of its meaning and efiect. (Pcol)!e 
v. Goold, 215 Cal. 763, 766 [12 P.2d 958]; People v. Lehcu', 
supra, at p. 343.) 
In the present ease, owing to the stipulation, there was 110 
instruction relating particularly to confessions. The members 
of the jury were instructed merely that they were the judges 
of the credibility of the witnesses and of the weight of the 
evidence. It would have been better practice to instruct them 
that they were the exclusive judges as to whether or not the 
confession was true. In a closer ease than the present one it 
is possible that the jury might view the stipulation as bearing 
both upon the voluntary character of the confession and upon 
its credibility. The failure of the court to give such an instruc-
tion, however, did not prejudice defendant. The psychiatrists 
ealled by defendant to testify were unanimous in their con-
clusion that defendant fully knew the meaning of questions 
asked him and the meaning and effect of the answers he gave. 
Although these witnesses were of the opinion that defendant 
i 
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might be unduly subject to suggestion, the record shows that 
when he confessed, he was unable to answer certain questions 
and categorically denied the commission of various acts 
charged by his victims. Furthermore, many of the important 
elements of the confession were corroborated by witnesses. 
[4] The evidence that defendant murdered decedent is 
sufficient to sustain the verdict independently of his comes-
, sion of that crime. He was identified by two witnesses as the 
person near the scene of the crime at the time of the murder. 
The murder weapon was traced to him and he directed the 
:. police in the recovery of decedent's purse. A complete ex· 
. amination of the record reveals no error substantial enough 
; to warrant a disturbance of the verdict or the judgment. 
; (People v. Gonzales, supra, at p. 877.) i.. . The judgment and the order denying defendant's mo-
f,; tion for a new trial are donned. 
I·~.;·.·, Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J .. Sc.ha.uer, ~ J .. and Spence, J., concurred. 
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